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The Nature of the Vietnam War
TH ERE ARE NO CENSUS TAKERS of the barbarism of the 20th 
century, and there has been far too much of it to measure. The 
executioners are not willing, and the victims are rarely able, to 
provide exact details. What is certain in Vietnam, save to those 
who have neither the will nor the interest to confront truth, is the 
general magnitude and quality of the United States’ combat against 
the Vietnamese. This relationship necessarily has a logic and 
structure which leads to war crimes as the inevitable consequence 
of a war that is intrinsically criminal. More important, the war is 
the outcome of post-World War II American policy toward the 
world and its efforts to resolve the United States’ greatest dilemma
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in the second half of this century: to relate its industrial power to 
the political and ideological realities of popular revolutionary move­
ments in the Third World.
After the Second World War the United States pursued its diplo­
macy on the traditional postulate of military power ultimately being 
based on physical plant, economic capacity and the ability 10 
destroy it. TTiis assumption was also a definition of the nature of 
the world conflict, which prior to 1950 had always been between 
industrial nations, and after 1945 designated the Soviet Union as 
the primary threat to American security and interests. Such a 
premise, which not so much discounted as ignored the mobilising 
potential of ideology and the capability of Third World guerrilla and 
liberation movements, gave the United States supreme confidence in 
the efficacy and strategic doctrines of its own military. This armed 
force was designed essentially to operate against a centralised, 
industrial society, a reinforcing proposition Washington thought 
the military and diplomatic facts, as well as its own economic 
priorities, warranted. Every strategy has a price tag, and strategic 
bombing has a predictable and relatively low cost, but it also 
necessitated a convenient and vulnerable industrial enemy.
The Korean war, which almost resulted in an American defeat 
in Korea, shattered a half-century of conventional wisdom and 
raised a critical dilemma. It immediately proved the limits of 
existing military strategy and technology against decentralised, non­
industrial nations. Apart from political or humanitarian considera­
tions, there were no decisive targets against which to employ the 
atomic military technology on which the US had pinned the bulk 
of its hopes and money.
After weakening its power everywhere else in the world, and 
embarking on what was to become the second most expensive war 
in its history, the United States waged the Korean war with “conven­
tional” arms intended for combat between industrial nations. Fought 
against comparatively poorly armed peasants, it was a war unlike 
any in modem history, and the Korean precedent reveals the 
principles and tactics to emerge in Vietnam in a more intensive 
form. Within three months the US destroyed all usual strategic 
targets in North Korea and over the last two years of the war it 
dropped about six times the tonnage used during the first year. 
Camps for non-combatants contained over 400,000 persons under 
guard, one-eighth of whom died of disease and starvation. Half 
the South Korean population was homeless or refugees by early 
1951, 2.5 million were refugees at war’s end, twice that number 
were on relief, over one million South Korean civilians died, and 
estimates of North Korea's losses are greater yet. As Major
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General Emmet O’Donnell Jnr., head of the Far Eastern Bomber 
Command, reported to the Senate in mid-1951: “I would say that 
the entire, almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess. 
Everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the 
name.”1 The Korean war, in brief, became a war against an entire 
nation, civilians and soldiers, Communists and anti-Communists 
alike, with everything regarded as a legitimate target for attack. By 
1953, when the US was farther from military victory or mastery 
than in the fall of 1950, the most important undamaged targets 
were the 20 irrigation o'ams so vital to the rice crop and civilian 
population of the North. Restraints operated until mid-May 1953, 
when five of these dams were destroyed, in one instance resulting 
in a flash flood that scooped clean 27 miles of valley.
For the Koreans, the war’s magnitude led to vast human suffering, 
but the United States learned that it was unable to translate its 
immense firepower into military or political victory for itself or its 
allies. There was, in brief, no conceivable relationship between 
the expenditure of arms and political or military results obtained. 
As the official Army history relates, utilising high mobility, decen­
tralisation and tunnel defences, the North Korean and Chinese 
armies greatly improved their equipment and logistics and ended 
the war “a formidable foe who bore little resemblance to the feeble 
nation of World War II.”2 Massive firepower had resulted in 
enormous civilian casualties and barbarism, but inhumanity was not 
victory.
The implications of Korea to the United States’ future were 
monumental, conjuring up the prospect of political and military 
defeat in Asia and vividly revealing the limits of its power. Massive 
land armies were both very expensive and of dubious utility, and 
it was in this context that John Foster Dulles attempted to break
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through the enigma with his “massive retaliation aeoaie — never 
satisfactorily translating it into a coherent and relevant strategy. 
Not only did Soviet nuclear power rule out attacking Russia with 
impunity, but even Washington in spring 1954 doubted whether 
Vietnamese peasants could be made to stop fighting if Moscow 
were destroyed, and the debate over employing atomic bombs at 
Dien Bien Phu only revealed that in close combat and mixed battle 
lines atomic bombs indiscriminately destroy friend and foe alike.
The dilemma of relating American technology to agrarian and 
decentralised societies was not resolved by the time President 
Kennedy came to office. Without delving into the “counter- 
insurgency” planning and assumptions which the President imme­
diately authorised General Maxwell Taylor to co-ordinate and 
study, it is sufficient to observe not only that the US began making 
its commitments in Vietnam keenly aware of the failures of the 
past, but it was still encumbered with the same limitations which 
might only repeat the Korean precedent of mass firepower, whole­
sale destruction of populations, and political-military failure. Nor 
is it necessary to review the familiar history of how the Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations intensified their involvement in Viet­
nam. More relevant is the distinctive character of that war, and 
the assumptions and manner in which the United States has employed 
its military might. I propose to outline the political and environ­
mental structure of the war and to show why the United States 
consciously employs a technology that is quantitatively far greater 
than that used in Korea but inevitably requires the same outcome 
in Vietnam: the destruction of untold masses of people and their 
society, and the concomitant moral immunisation of the American 
civilians and soldiers called upon to sustain and implement the 
Government’s grand strategy.
A War Without Fronts
One of the most significant realities of the war in Vietnam, a fact 
which, makes “legal” combat impossible and necessitates endless 
crimes against civilians and combatants alike, is the absence of 
conventional military fronts and areas of uncontested American 
control. The Tet Offensive proved once again that combat can 
occur anywhere and that the military initiative rests with the NLF. 
American forces, in reality, form enclaves in a sea of hostility and 
instability, able temporarily to contest NLF physical control over 
large regions but incapable of substituting Saigon’s political infra­
structure to establish durable control by winning the political and 
ideological loyalties of the large majority of the people. Perhaps 
most ironically, the NLF has been able to transform this American 
presence, which it has not been able to remove physically, into
(i A U S T R A L IA N  LEFT R EV IEW — JU N E-JU LY. 1970
a symbiotic relationship from which they extract maximum possible 
assets in what is intrinsically an intolerable and undesired situation. 
For this reason as well, they are able to endure the war the longest, 
prevail, and win at the end, even should they lose a great number 
of military encounters.
The Pentagon’s statements notwithstanding, there now exists more 
than sufficient documentation proving that the US claims to “control”
67 per cent of the South Vietnamese population, as before Tet 
1968, or 92 per cent as of late 1969, bear no relationship to reality.1 
Suffice it to say, the Pentagon also maintains private figures, data 
that simply reinforces the inescapable conclusions of a logical 
analysis of its own releases, that a very substantial majority of 
the South Vietnamese are not under the physical “control” of 
either the Saigon regime or US forces. Apart from political loyalty, 
which claims on hamlet control ignore, the supreme irony of the 
war in Vietnam is that hamlets labelled “secure” for public purposes, 
such as Song My, are often the hardest hit by American arms. The 
reason is fundamental: areas, villages, and large population con­
centrations the NLF operationally controls frequently co-operate 
in Saigon-sponsored surveys and projects to spare themselves un­
necessary conflict with US and Saigon forces. To lie about the 
presence of the NLF to a visiting pacification officer is a small 
matter in comparison to the certain military consequences the truth 
will invite. What the Pentagon describes as the “secure” area in 
Vietnam is often a staging and economic base as secure and vital 
to the NLF as its explicitly identified liberated zones.
Therefore we read innumerable accounts of trade and movement 
between Saigon-“controlled” areas and those of the NLF, and of 
“friendly” villagers and Saigon’s Popular Forces (only one-eighth 
of whom are trusted with arms) who fail to report NLF combat 
units and infrastructures. Hence, too, the existence of at least
5,000 NLF political workers in the greater Saigon area, to use 
minimal American figures, and the undoubted accuracy of the NLF 
claim to have parallel governments in all major cities and towns. 
American admissions that three-quarters of the NLF budget in 1968 
was raised from taxes collected from one-half the Vietnamese 
population, that Saigon’s eight largest corporations paid an average 
of $100,000 each in taxes to the NLF, or that it purchases vast 
quantities of supplies from “secure” towns, is much more to the
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point.4 To some critical measure, “secure” areas are both a part 
of, and vital to, the NLF. And to be “secure” is not to be a 
continuous free-fire zone. The question is not who claims “control” 
but who really possesses it. For the most part, such control as 
the US may have is temporary and ultimately is based on its ability 
and willingness to apply firepower, and certainly is not a consequence 
of any popular support for its financed and universally corrupt 
regimes in Saigon.
The refugee camps and program are good examples of the 
NLF’s ability to turn what the US intends as adversity into a 
dual-edged institution from which they may gain as much as a 
repressive situation allows —  so long as it retains the respect and 
political loyalties of the people. These camps were both the 
inevitable by-product of America’s massive firepower applied to 
all Vietnam and its explicit desire to reconcentrate the population 
so as to better control it. “You have to be able to separate the 
sheep from the goats,” to quote one Pentagon-sponsored analyst in 
1966. “The way to do it is harsh. You would have to put all 
military age males in the army or in camps as you pacify the 
country. Anyone not in the army or in camp is a target. He’s 
either a Viet Cong or is helping them.”5
By May 1969 the war had produced 3,153,000 refugees since 
1965, 612,000 still remained in camps and with only a tiny fraction 
having been resettled in their original villages. The large majority 
of the refugees, as every objective account agrees, were seeking to 
escape the free-fire zones and rain of fire the Americans were 
showering on them. Their political loyalties were anti-Saigon 
in the large majority of cases, and the intense squalor, degradation, 
and corruption in the camps undoubtedly mitigates such small 
sympathy for the anti-NLF cause as may exist. No less significant 
about the camps is the very high percentage of old men, women, 
and children in them —  that is, non-combatants. In this sense, 
by entering the American camps refugees escape the American 
bombs while the younger men generally remain in the combat 
areas. Roger Hilsman put it another way in 1967: “I think it 
would be a mistake to think that the refugees come toward the 
Government side out of sympathy. . . (They) come toward the 
Government side simply because the Vietcong do not bomb, and 
that they will not at least be bombed and shelled. I have greater
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worries that some of the refugee camps are rest areas for the 
Vietcong, precisely because of this.”8
Refugee camps therefore become incubators of opposition as well 
as potential shelters for it, just as many reported NLF defectors, 
very few of whom are regular combatants, are now suspected of 
returning to NLF ranks after a period of recuperation. Such 
integration of the institutional structure of “secure” areas with 
that which the NLF dominates, this profound lack of clear lines and 
commitments among the Vietnamese, attains its ultimate danger for 
the Americans when it is revealed that the Vietnamese support for 
the N LF extends to parts of the highest levels of the Saigon regime. 
We know little of the process by which Vu Ngoc Nha, Huynh Van 
Trong, and their 39 associates penetrated the intimate circle of 
the Thieu regime and became privy to its secrets, but it is certain 
that many officers, soldiers and administrators of the Saigon regime 
are secrtetly committed to the NLF cause, and it is no less certain 
that most other Saigon leaders are deeply dedicated to enriching 
themselves, even via trade with the NLF regions, and are totally 
unreliable for the US’s ultimate purposes. Such an army of 
unwilling conscripts, corrupt officers and politically unreliable 
elements in their midst is a dubious asset to the US and alone 
scarcely an unmanageable threat to the NLF. Hence the chimera 
of “Vietnamisation”. The various Administrations have known all 
this, and much more.
It is one of the lessons of 20th century history that repression 
and social disintegration generate forces of opposition that otherwise 
would not have existed and Vietnam is no exception. No one can 
comprehend the development and success of the NLF without appre­
ciating this fact. Vietnamese forced out of their villages by air 
and artillery strikes and into decrepit and unsanitary camps know 
full well that the Americans are responsible. The army of prosti­
tutes are aware of the source of their degradation. The peasant 
whose crops are defoliated knows who to blame. Apart from its 
attractive political program and land reform policy, the NLF has 
successfully capitalised on the near universal Vietnamese hatred of 
foreign invaders, a fact that has made its political infrastructure
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and loyalties of the people to it increasingly durable even as 
growing firepower is inflicted upon them. “They say this village 
is 80 per cent VC supporters,” one American officer commented 
last September as his men combed a village. “By the time we 
finish this it will be 95 per cent.”s Such insight is scarcely atpyical, 
but appears to be universal in the available documents on this 
aspect of the war.
This realism on repression intensifying resistance, as well as 
every other phase of the struggle in Vietnam I have mentioned, 
sets the indispensable context in which the US applies its military 
power, for it long ago abandoned operating within the acknowledged 
political limits of South Vietnam. More precisely, by employing 
sheer physical might, the US has sought to compensate for and 
transcend its unavoidable political weaknesses in its Vietnam 
adventure. The various men in the White House and Pentagon 
know better than any of us that the lines are indeed everywhere, 
and that the Vietnamese people are overwhelmingly real and potential 
enemies. And since the Vietnamese long ceased to be promising 
ideological targets, tractable to successive corrupt regimes, they 
have virtually all become physical targets everywhere. Quite apart 
from the results —  for the United States is slowly learning that its 
efforts have become both militarily insufficient and politically self- 
defeating —  the necessary logic of American military strategy in 
Vietnam is to wage war against the entire Vietnamese people, men, 
women and children alike, wherever they may be found. So long 
as it remains in Vietnam, it cannot fight another kind of war 
with any more hope of success.
Machines Against People: American Military Premises
The original theory of counter-insurgency in White House circles 
in 1961 was that a limited number of men, wise in the ways of 
guerrilla ideology and tactics, could enter the jungles with conven­
tional small arms and win. Given the political, military and ideo­
logical realities, this premise by 1964 was utterly discredited, and 
there followed a major scramble to develop new “miracle” weapons 
intended to overcome the NLF’s clear military superiority. The 
problem, however, is that it requires five to seven years to translate 
a sophisticated weapons concept into adequate field deployment, 
and in 1965 weapons ideas already in progress were designed over­
whelmingly for a war in Europe. A mass of exotic crash research
* NYT, Septem ber 24, 1969. See also U.S. Senate, Civilian Casualty . . 90:1, p. 
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proposals proved, on the whole, to be expensive miscarriages, and 
it was already commissioned projects in helicopters and gunships 
that were most readily transferable to the Vietnam context. The 
helicopter's distinctive value pointed to the defining objective 
condition of the military phase of the Vietnam war: decentralisation 
and a lack of military targets. Without the mobility the helicopter 
provided, General Westmoreland has estimated, one million more 
troops would have been required to fight the same war on the 
ground.9
While the United States has sought to discover and procure 
weapons uniquely designed for the decentralised agrarian and jungle 
environment, it has also attempted to utilise existing weapons first 
designed for such concentrated strategic targets as industry and 
air-missile bases. This, by necessity, has required employing weapons, 
such as the B52, originally constructed for intensive, nuclear war­
fare against stationary targets. It has adjusted for decentralised 
mobile targets simply by dropping much greater quantities of 
explosives of immense yield on vast regions with very few permanent 
military installations. Militarily, the United States has therefore 
fought the war with whatever decentralised-style weapons it could 
develop as well as the sheer quantity of firepower which “conven­
tional” weapons employ. The pre-eminent characteristic of both 
these approaches is that they are intrinsically utterly indiscriminate 
in that they strike entire populations. And while such strategy 
violates all international law regarding warfare, and is inherently 
geriocidal, it also adjusts to the political reality in South Vietnam 
that the NLF is and can be anywhere and that virtually the entire 
people is Washington’s enemy.
I am not contriving something the Pentagon does not already 
know. “The unparalleled, lavish use of firepower as a substitute 
for manpower,” writes one of its analysts in an official publica- 
1 tion, “is an outstanding characteristic of US military tactics in 
the Vietnam war.”10 From 315,000 tons of air ordnance dropped 
in Southeast Asia in 1965, the quantity by January-October 1969, 
the peak year of the war, reached 1,388,000 tons. Over that period,
4,580,000 tons were dropped in Southeast Asia, or six and one-half 
times that employed in Korea. To this we must add ground 
munitions, which rose from 577,000 tons in 1966 to 1,278,000 tons 
in the first 11 months of 1969. And to these destruction-intensive
# N orm an, Arm y, p. 56 and passim; DOD, 1969, Pt. i ,  pp. 33-34; 1)01), 1968, 
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weapons applied extensively we must also add the wide-impact 
decentralised weapons that are employed in ever greater quantities 
alone or in conjunction with traditional explosives. For the family 
of cluster bomb weapons and flechette rockets, which the Air Force 
rates as “highly successful ’, I have no procurement data. Suffice 
to say, these are exclusively anti-personnel weapons covering much 
wider areas than bombs. CS (a type of advanced tear gas) pro­
curement is one example: from 1965 to 1969 the amount purchased 
went up 24 times. Procurement for defoliants and anti-crop chemi­
cals is erratic because of inventory and production problems, though 
the Air Force’s far too conservative data on acreage sprayed has 
risen quite consistently from less than 100,000 acres in 1964 to 
an adjusted annual rate of 15 times that in 1969. Procurement in 
1964 was $1.7 million and $15.9 million in 1970, with an inventory 
in 1970 almost equal to new purchases.11
Translated into human terms, the US has made South Vietnam 
a sea of fire as a matter of policy, turning an entire nation into a 
target. This is not accidental but intentional and intrinsic to the 
US’s strategic and political premises in the Vietnam war. By neces­
sity it destroys villages, slaughters all who are in the way, uproots 
families, and shatters a whole society. There is a mountain of 
illustrations, but let me take only one here —  that of the B52 which 
reveals how totally conscious this strategy is.
The B52s cost about $850 million to operate in Southeast Asia 
in fiscal 1970, a bit less than 1969 but far more than 1968, and 
they drop about 43,000 tons a month. On what? The one official 
survey of actual hits that I have been able to locate states that 
“enemy camps”, often villages full of civilians, “were where intelli­
gence said they would be” in only one-half the cases. In the other 
half, intelligence was faulty, and the camps were either not there 
or the VC had not been in the target area when the bombs fell.”12 
Then on whom did the bombs fall? On Vietnamese peasants in 
both cases, on thousands of Song Mys.
Stated another way, in 1968-69 the US used about 7700-7800 
tons of ground and air ordnance during an average day. At the 
time of the 1968 Tet offensive, the Pentagon estimates, NLF forces 
were consuming a peak of 27 tons of ammunition a day, and half 
that amount during an average day in April, 1969. Roughly,
11 Joseph W. M arshall [chief, Magazine k  Book Branch, D irectorate for D efense 
Inform ation, Office o f  the Asst. Sec. of Defense for Public Affairs] to G abriel 
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this is a ratio of 250 or 500 to one. Inequalities of similar 
magnitude appear when one compares overall supply, including 
food, which for all NLF and DRV forces in the south was 7,500 
tons per month at the end of 1968. At the beginning of 1968 
American fuel needs alone were 14 million tons a month.13 Out 
of this staggering ratio of conspicuous consumption has come only 
conspicuous failure for the US, but also a level of firepower that so 
far exceeds distinctions between combatants and non-combatants 
as to be necessarily aimed at all Vietnamese.
>
In an air and mechanical war against an entire people, in which 
no fixed lines exist and high mobility and decentralisation give 
the NLF a decisive military advantage, barbarism can be the only 
consequence of the US’s sledge-hammer tactics. During Tet 1968, 
when the US learned that the “secure” areas can become part of 
the front when the NLF so chooses, US air and artillery strikes 
destroyed half of Mytho, with a population of 70,000, four-fifths 
of Hue’s inner city, more than one-third of Chaudoc, killed over
1,000 civilians in Ben Tre, 2,000 in Hue —  to cite only the better 
known of many examples.14 But what is more significant to the 
ultimate outcome of the war is that such barbarism is also accom­
panied by an ineffectuality —  entirely aside from the question of 
politics and economics —  which makes the US’s failure in Vietnam 
certain.
Indiscriminate firepower is likely to hit civilian targets simply 
because there are many more of them, and directly and indirectly 
that serves the US’s purpose as all Administrations define them. 
But we know enough about mass firepower and strategic bombing 
to know not merely that it is counter-productive politically but also 
an immense waste militarily. As a land war, the Vietnam campaign 
for the US has been a mixture of men and mobility via helicopters, 
with the NLF generally free to fight at terms, places and times 
°f its own choosing. And because of ideology and allegiance, 
the NLF always fills the critical organisational vacuum the Ameri­
cans and their sponsored Saigon regime leave behind. But even 
when in the field, the US soldier lacks both motivation and a concept 
°f the ideological and political nature of the war, which makes him 
tend toward terror and poor combat at one and the same time. Had 
he and his officers the will and knowledge to win— which, I add, would 
scarcely suffice to attain victory —  the American army would not 
be repeating the tale of Song My over and over again. For Song 
My is simply the foot soldier’s direct expression of the axiom of
13 M arshall to Herm an, Jan . 15, 1970; NYT, November 2. 1968; Gabriel Kolko, 
T h e  V ietnam  W ar and Diplomacy", London Bulletin, August 1969, p. 24.
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fire and terror that his superiors in Washington devise and command 
from behind desks. No one should expect the infantryman to 
comprehend the truths about the self-defeating consequences of 
terror and repression that have escaped the generals and politicians. 
The real war criminals in history never fire guns, never suffer dis­
comfort. The fact is, as the military discussions now reveal, that 
morale and motivation are low among troops, not merely toward the 
end of tours of duty, or when combat follows no pattern and “morale 
goes down and down”, to quote one Pentagon analyst, but also 
because an unwilling foreign conscript army has not and cannot 
in the 20th century win a colonial intervention.15
WE CAN SCARCELY COMPREHEND the war in Vietnam by 
concentrating on specific weapons and incidents, on Song My, B52s 
or defoliants. What is illegal and immoral, a crime against the 
Vietnamese and against civilisation as we think it should be, is the 
entire war and its intrinsic character. Mass bombing, the uprooting 
of populations, “search-and-destroy” —  all of this and far more 
is endemic to a war that can never be “legal” or moral so long 
as it is fought. For what is truly exceptional and unintended in 
Vietnam, from the Government’s viewpoint, are the B52 missions, 
defoliants and artillery attacks that do not ravage villages and 
fields. Specific weapons and incidents are deplorable, but we 
must see them as effects and not causes. The major undesired, 
accidental aspect of the entire Vietnam experience, as three Admin­
istrations planned it, was that the Vietnamese resistance, with its 
unshakable roots everywhere in that tortured nation, would survive 
and ultimately prevail rather than be destroyed by the most intense 
rain of fire ever inflicted on men and women. For the history 
of America’s role in Vietnam is not one of accident but rather of 
the failure of policy.
Given what is so purposeful and necessary to the United States’ 
war in Vietnam, and the impossibility and the undesirability of 
America relating to that nation by other than military means, 
there is only one way to terminate the endless war crimes system­
atically and daily committed there —  to end the intrinsically 
criminal war now, to withdraw all American forces immediately. 
And while the Vietnamese succor and heal their wounds, Americans 
must attempt to cure their own moribund social illness so that 
this nation will never again commit such folly and profound evil.
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T h e  Public and the Now G eneration”, A rm y, Jan u ary  1970, p. 26; James P- 
Sterba, "T h e  H ours of Boredom, T h e  Seconds of T e rro r”, New  York Times 
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